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I. INTRODUCTION 
State public utility commissions play an enormous role in the 
regulation of different industries that have subtle but substantial 
effects on the daily lives of consumers—which includes citizens who 
uses these services, that is to say nearly everyone in the United 
States.1  Regulated industries, generally referred to as investor owned 
utilities,2 include gas, electric, or water providers, regional 
telecommunication, and railroad companies.3  Some jurisdictions may 
also regulate regional light rail transportation, buses, automated 
vehicles, or ride hailing services.4   
Many public utility commissions were originally created to 
regulate railroad companies.5  However, during the transition to the 
modern era their reach was greatly expanded to encompass the host of 
now regulated public industries.6  In more recent times, the role of the 
                                                 
* E. Nathan Cheung.  J.D. Candidate 2020, Pepperdine University School of 
Law.  Thanks to Christopher Campbell and Yoori Chung for their guidance, advice, 
and criticism of prior drafts.  Special thanks to Professor Gregory Ogden for our 
conversations on administrative and regulatory law during my time as his student 
and member of this journal.  I am also deeply indebted to Lauren Jacobs and Rachel 
Zarrabi for their excellent edits and thoughtful comments.  All errors or omissions 
in this paper are solely my own.   
1 New Database Provides a Window into Public Utility Commissions in All 50 
U.S. States, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/9HQV-RALK.   
2 Also known as publicly owned utilities because they are owned by members 
of the public, namely investors.  See generally Differences Between Publicly and 
Investor-Owned Utilities, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/pou_reporting/background/difference_pou_iou.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2020).  
3 See, e.g., Utilities and Industries, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/UtilitiesIndustries/ 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Introduction, HAW. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://puc.hawaii.gov/about/introduction/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); About the 
DPU, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., https://www.mass.gov/about-the-dpu (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2020); About the PUCT, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., 
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/about/mission.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).  
4 See generally Javier Campos & Pedro Cantos, Rail Transport Regulation, 
ECON. DEV. INSTITUTE OF THE WORLD BANK, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284281468764045820/135535322_200
41117180643/additional/multi-page.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Truck and Bus 
Regulation Compliance Requirement Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onrdiesel/documents/fsregsum.pdf (last updated 
June 18, 2019); Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-
vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx.  
5 See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 3.   
6 See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., supra note 3.   
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public utility commission has further expanded beyond regulation of 
specific industries to become tools to implement various policy goals 
and attitudes towards respective industries.7 
Part II of this paper will seek to address different issues that may 
be encountered by the modern public utility commission.8  Part II 
provides a brief description of the regulatory framework that serves as 
an epistemic rationale for public utility commissions.9  Further, Part II  
provides a description of the broad statutory and implicit powers of 
public utility commissions.10   
Part III of this paper seeks to present the concept of incentive 
regulation, which beyond its common support in economic theory, 
also has a basis in moral theory.11  Notable among these is the 
Aristotelian concept of akrasia,12 which serves both as a guiding 
principle for the tendencies of individual corporate behavior and a 
rationale for regulating behavior.13  Additionally, Part III introduces  
the Humean idea of motivation,14 which provides the principle for 
regulation based on incentivizing and rewarding behavior.15  Part III 
also considers a sociological approach of punishment based on 
disincentivizing certain behavior by placing public spotlight on 
actions deemed immoral.16   
Lastly, Part IV seeks to analyze incentive regulation applied to the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).17  The purpose of the 
analysis is both to prescribe the applicability of incentive regulation, 
and also assign potential challenges with this approach.  Part IV 
outlines the unique, specific authority of the CPUC as a 
                                                 
7 Engagement Between Public Utility Commissions and State Legislatures, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/engagement-between-public-utility-
commissions-and-state-legislatures.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
8 See infra Part II.  
9 See infra id.  
10 See infra id.  Most of this authority stems from the state and may be 
independent from federal law.  Id.  
11 See infra Part III.  
12 See Aristotle, infra note 46. 
13 See id.; infra Part II.   
14 See Smith, infra note 62.   
15 See id.  
16 See infra Part III.  
17 See infra Part IV.  This article discusses the California Public Utilities 
Commission because it is historically one of the largest and best staffed 
commissions, while overseeing one of the largest states in the nation.  See, e.g., 
CPUC History & Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).  
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constitutionally enabled regulatory body.18  It also identifies areas 
where incentive regulation is readily applicable at the CPUC, where it 
has already applied, and how it could supplement its current 
regulatory scheme.19  Part IV ends with a discussion of unique 
challenges the CPUC faces with incentive regulation.20   
 
II.  THE MODERN PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION 
In the nineteenth century, many states began forming their own 
respective precursor to the modern public utility commission to 
regulate railroads.21  Early on, the powers of these commissions were 
fairly limited.22  It was not until years later that legislation provided 
additional powers to regulate electricity and natural gas.23  It is within 
the authority of public utility commissions to regulate rates of those 
utilities that much of its modern authority stems.24   
 
A. Public Utility Commissions 
State statutes organize many types of public utility commission.25  
Often, either public citizens or a state governor appoints the 
commissioners who comprise a commission.26  Depending on the 
state’s resources, a public utility commission may be quite large and 
include several specialized departments staffed by experts in each 
specific industry.27   
The precursor to public utility commissions were commissions 
that regulated the railroad industry.28  Later, as electricity and gas 
power became prominent aspects of modern life, states enacted 
legislation expanding the regulatory authority of these industries to 
                                                 
18 CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 2.  Contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25 § 1 (2020); TEX. 
UTIL. CODE § 11.002(c) (2017).   
19 See infra Part IV.  
20 See id.  
21 I. Leo Sharfman, Commission Regulation of Public Utilities: A Survey of 
Legislation, 53 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI., 1, 1-18 
(1914); see also Scott, infra note 29, at 378.   
22 Sharfman, supra note 21, at 1.  
23 Id.; see also Scott, infra note 29, at 378.   
24 Sharfman, supra note 21, at 16.   
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 For links to department organization charts, see About the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Department of Public 
Utilities (DPU), MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., https://www.mass.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2020); see also ICC Offices and Bureaus, ILL. COMM. COMM’N, 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/about/offices (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
28 Supra note 3.   
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public utility commissions.29  Since that time, the original power of 
railroads has declined and public utility commissions have shifted 
greater focus towards energy regulation.30   
 
B. The Broad Reach and Authority of Public Utility Commissions 
While the respective authority of public utility commissions may 
vary based on state legislation, most public utility commissions are 
endowed with authority to regulate rates that are “just and 
reasonable.”31  This provides each state commission discretion to 
determine the rates of each state utility within its jurisdiction.32  
Additionally, each commission is typically granted authority to 
generate its own procedural rules.33   
This regulation of utilities has often been referred to as a 
regulatory compact between state commissions and regulated 
industries.34  Because many of these regulated industries had 
monopolies over their service areas, government regulation 
substituted for the absence of general competition.35  Under this 
scheme, public utility commissions serve “a multi-faceted purpose: 
(1) to ensure that customers ha[ve] access to safe, reliable service; (2) 
to prevent discrimination against certain classes of customers; and (3) 
to ensure that the cost for service rendered under monopoly 
conditions remain[s] reasonable.”36   
By setting rates, the commissions have the authority to determine 
the profits of a regulated utility.37  Conversely, rate setting also 
affects the service cost and citizen’s living standards within the 
state.38  Traditionally, ratemaking has focused on the balance between 
investor and consumer interests.39  “The return to the equity owner 
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other 
                                                 
29 Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility 
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 378 (2014).   
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 366.041(1) 
(2019).   
32 Sharfman, supra note 21, at 7.   
33 Id. at 9.   
34 See, e.g., Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy 
Innovation Cycle: The View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS 
L. J. 1345, 1356 (2014).   
35 Scott, supra note 29, at 385.   
36 Id.  
37 Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at 1356.   
38 Id.  
39 Scott, supra note 29, at 381; see also Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at 
135. 
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enterprises having corresponding risks.  That return, moreover, 
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of 
the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.”40  
However, in recent years, rate setting has expanded to encompass 
approval of utility projects by its state’s public utility commission.41  
Under the authority of ratemaking, a commission has authority over a 
utility’s ability to make significant new investments.42  While a 
commission generally does not have independent power to mandate 
utility construction of new sites, the state legislature may delegate the 
power to the public utility commission.43  Thus, through its delegated 
authority, a commission may regulate various qualities of site 
construction and the subsequent rate effect of those projects.44 
 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REGULATION 
With the advent of greater tools, a commission may consider 
adopting new policies and different concepts to regulate industries.45  
industries.45  This section will consider several different philosophical 
philosophical concepts for guidance in assessing the behavior of a 
utility.  
 
A. Akrasia: Wrong Action Without Knowledge 
Concerns about the actual motivation may arise when attempting 
to discern a utility’s moral judgments about their action.  It might be 
simplistic to assume that every action is based on the utility’s moral 
judgment.  Thus, when an actor act badly, it may be an instance 
where although she arrived through moral reasoning to a correct 
moral judgment, she nonetheless volitionally decided not to act upon 
it.  Thus, she may decide to act contrary to what she reasoned to be 
good, and instead act otherwise.46  This then is contrary to the Plato’s 
idea in Protagoras, more like the opposite view of what Aristotle calls 
akrasia, or weakness of the will.47  In this way, the akratic individual 
                                                 
40 Scott, supra note 29, at 381. 
41 Id. at 394. 
42 Id.; see also William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: 
Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 
(2016).   
43 Scott, supra note 29, at 393; see also Monast & Adair, supra note 34, at 
1356. 
44 Scott, supra note 29, at 394. 
45 See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, 3 state commissions upending the way utilities 
do business, UTILITYDIVE (Oct. 2, 2019), utilitydive.com/news/3-state-
commissions-upending-the-way-utilities-do-business/563949/.  
46 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VII, at 105-27 (W.D. Ross trans., 
Batoche Books ed. 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E). 
47 Id. 
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is more akin to someone who reasoned poorly and came to a 
conclusion that was wrong or immoral.48  Rather the akratic 
individual is someone who reasoned well and knows better, but 
acted contrary to what they have reasoned well or good.49  Thus, 
arises the problem of what should be done to resolve this 
to act well despite moral reasoning otherwise.   
Inversely, it is not unimaginable that regulators occasionally fail 
to act well through their regulation.  This may stem from deficiencies 
in information or resources.50  Such deficiencies could severely limit 
a commission to only identify especially bad utility action, while 
unknowingly permitting numerous other to persist.51   
 
B. Motivation: Causation for Moral Action 
Hume’s theory of motivation (Humean theory) seeks to 
the effect of moral judgments on actions.52  One of the principles 
behind the Humean theory is that moral judgments connect to 
motivation.53  Moral judgments refer to conclusions based on all 
the information the actor possesses, which is translated into a 
decision as the best or worst action that the actor might take.54  
Although moral judgments may be considered subjective, the 
resulting actions are not because the tangible real-world 
consequences always exist.55  The premise behind the Humean 
theory is a nexus between the cognitive state of belief and 
motivation.56  Thus, where one’s moral judgments affect and 
enlighten their actions, and what one adjudges to be moral or right 
should motivate them to action.57   
Here, the Humean theory seems to echo the Platonic idea that 
no man acts contrary to what they believe is good, even if his 
                                                 
48 Id.  
49 Aristotle’s Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://perma.cc/SQS2-LYHJ (last updated June 15, 2018).   
50 Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for 
Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG., 1, 12 (1986).   
51 Id.   
52 Moral Motivation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sep. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/PSA7-4Q98.   
53 Id.  
54 See Steve Guglielmo, Moral judgment as information processing; an 
integrative review, 6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 1-19 (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4626624/pdf/fpsyg-06-
01637.pdf.  Put more simply, whether it is good or bad to perform a given 
action.  See, e.g., id. at 1.  
55 See, e.g., id. at 1-19. 
56 Moral Motivation, supra note 52.  
57 Id. 
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good is considered wrong by all others.58  In this way, no individual 
deliberately acts wrongly while at the same time maintaining the 
understanding he is acting wrongly.59  An individual that, in fact, is 
acting wrongly will always do so with the belief his wrong action is 
good.  Thus, in the context of Hume’s theory, one’s moral judgment 
(i.e. what the individual believes to be morally right) always 
translates and motivates their actions.60   
In the context of a regulated utility’s  behavior, there is often a 
break between correct behavior and the bad behavior.  Thus, one must 
presume that no regulated utility deliberately acts in a way that 
violates the regulator’s  rules.  Under the premise that no utility can 
deliberately act wrongfully while in fact acting wrongly, the error 
must lie in the utility’s actions.  Thus, there must be some error in the 
utility’s judgment in determining its actions, such as where an action 
that is actually wrong, the actor believes it is good.   
If the argument is that the utility’s error is the result of its own 
poor moral behavior, something like a monetary fine would be 
unsuccessful in remediating that error.  Even if an actor is punished 
for an action, the actor cannot reasonably change an action that it 
intrinsically believes to be correct because this is what motivates the 
action.   
Thus, applied to the context of fines, there must be a better way to 
correct the utility’s behavior besides merely fining them.  A fine only 
indicates to the utility that an action was contrary to the regulator’s 
standard of good action.  However, an indicator neither necessarily, 
nor sufficiently corrects poor judgment leading to the bad behavior.61  
Rather there must be some sort of re-education to repair the defective 
moral judgments of the actor, i.e., a regulated utility.   
Initially, it seems easy to reduce this to an assumption that 
regulated utilities (or anything in the Humean theory) are based on 
what some have called a “strong phenomenological conception” of 
desires.62  Here, phenomenological conception refers to motivations 
and desires like feelings—sequences that occur as a result of some 
                                                 
58 See PLATO, PROTAGORAS (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 380 B.C.E), 
http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/protagoras.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
59 Id. 
60 Moral Motivation, supra note 52.  
61 See H.A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, 21 MIND 21, 
21-37 (1912) (noting that signifiers provide a description of a value, but provide no 
insight toward the value itself).   
62 Michael Smith, The Humean Theory of Motivation, 96 MIND 35, 45 (Jan. 
1987) (defining that desires are, like sensations, simply and essentially states that 
have a certain phenomenological content).   
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random stimulus or desire for something.63  However, although 
motivations or desires may initially seem phenomenological, that 
result for a subject’s fallibility in understanding one’s own 
Rather, these desires are propositional and based on a series of 
contributing factors or reasons.65  Thus, they are not the result of 
spontaneous appearance of ideas despite however much an actor 
might feel or believe their motivations are spontaneous. 
 
C. Shame: An Imperfect Response to Wrong Action 
One difficulty with the Humean theory is the possibility that 
despite efforts to correct moral behavior, the actor still acts 
Here, a regulated party might rather choose to take its chances and 
risk greater penalties than to make additional strides toward self-
reporting and self-auditing of compliance.  Thus, the actor’s 
moral judgment may remain unaltered despite attempts at 
reeducation or conditioning to mend his behavior.   
Nonetheless, if the utility deliberately acts wrongfully, there 
conceivably must be another way to enforce correct moral 
behavior.  Thus, there exists the sociological approach of 
somehow shining the spotlight on an agency or even shaming the 
infringing utility for its bad behavior.   
Throughout history, shaming a wrongdoer has been a staple of 
human punishment.67  Shaming has ranged from public hangings 
to criminals in the stocks.68  Applied to the context of a utility, it 
stretches the imagination to find ways to shame a utility.  Beyond 
ostracizing the leadership of a utility for their poor decision-
making, the apparent ways to shame a utility into correct behavior 
are limited.69   
However, taken in conjunction with other approaches 
mentioned above, perhaps a form of hybrid shaming may be 
appropriate.  Regulators may seek to shame the utility by making 
public: (1) the monetary fine inflicted on the utility public, (2) 
past attempts of reeducating and fixing the utility’s poor moral 
                                                 
63 Id. at 46.   
64 Id. at 47.   
65 Id.  
66 See, e.g., id. at 35-37. 
67 See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 UNIV. OF 
PENN. LAW REV. 1811, 1811-68 (2001).  
68 See Roger Hood, Capital punishment, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/capital-punishment; ADAM 
JAY HIRSH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN 
EARLY AMERICA 5 (1992).   
69 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67. 
68 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 40-1 
 
 
judgment public,70 (3) and the attempts and steps taken to condition 
the utility to act better public.71  While traditional forms of shaming 
done for the sake of shaming (e.g., hanging or putting in the stocks)72 
may be unsuccessful, shaming that affects the utility’s reputation by 
highlighting its indignation may be more successful in deterring poor 
behavior.73   
It may be presumed that when the utility’s continued bad behavior 
behavior is “aired out,” it would change.74  When the utility’s bad 
behavior is made public, it becomes a public image problem that the 
the utility is more inclined to repair.75   
However, the problem with shaming utilities and their leadership 
leadership is that those liable are seldom held accountable.76  
Corporate leadership frequently shifts, and decisionmakers 
responsible for bad actions may be gone by the time the negative 
effects are realized as severe violations.77  Thus, shaming runs the 
risk of punishing the wrong actors, indeed, those who are not even the 
actors responsible for the violations may be punished.78  Furthermore, 
with corporate reshuffling, there is the possibility that those who were 
responsible for establishing a culture of non-compliance might be 
completely gone and liability may be difficult to trace to the 
originators.79   
Thus, if agency bad behavior is characterized as a public image 
problem, an alternative would be to shine the spotlight on regulated 
parties and presenting them to the public for accountability.80  Indeed, 
shaming would only aggravate and serve a certain sort of “justice” 
without any promise of true societal benefit.81  However, by seeking 
to transfer some of the regulation to public opinion, the agency may 
be caused to change their attitudes and policies.82   
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 See Hood, supra note 68; HIRSH, supra note 68.  
73 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., ALISON E. WOODWARD, JERRY ELIG, & TOM R. BURNS, MUNICIPAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ENERGY POLICY: A FIVE NATION STUDY OF POLITICS, 
INNOVATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1-266 (Routledge 2019) (1994).  
78 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 67. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.   
81 Id.   
82 Id.   
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One method is deterrence-based enforcement.83  Under this 
method, the first strategy is a performance-based approach where 
“[w]hat is being spotlighted is the performance of government 
institutions—and such an approach ties in perfectly with the 
mantra of accountability.”84   
Second, similar to the first suggestion, increasing transparency 
government by “promoting transparency, because it is a useful 
policy tool to influence [compliance] related behavior for the 
and because it is the ‘right thing to do’ in an open society, has 
strong support in recent years.”85  Similar to the Humean idea that 
there are correct moral judgments,86 this approach furthers the 
that if the regulator is unable to fully hold the regulated party 
accountable, and the regulated party is unwilling to hold itself 
accountable,87 then the public might hold the regulated party 
accountable.   
This may be manifest through the agency reporting on the 
accomplishments of respective regulated parties.  For example, a 
report on the industry leaders in compliance among a subset of 
utilities or providing statistics of fulfilled incentive goals.  
Furthermore, such a report may contain information about a 
regulated party’s statistics of self-reporting and subsequent 
compliance.  Thus, this would provide transparency on how the 
utility is regulated and how they have been interacting with the 
respective agency.  Furthermore, this would provide the public 
with insight into how commissions function and how they 
regulate utilities.88  Thus, when the regulator is transparent about 
the progress—or lack of progress through omission or deficiency 
in reporting—of industries, it may inspire change among similar 
actors in the same regulated industry.   
Notably, the commission may include a policy of granting 
interested third parties standing to represent consumer interests in 
its proceedings.89  These intervenors, notable in energy,90 are 
                                                 
83 David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 
“Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 100 (2000).   
84 Id.   
85 Id.    
86 Smith, supra note 62.   
87 Id.  Forms of this might include self-reporting or demonstrated good 
faith efforts towards compliance.  See Markell, supra note 83. 
88 Markell, supra note 83.   
89 Intervenor Compensation Program, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/icomp/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
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usually fully staffed organizations comprised of specialists in the field 
such as attorneys and experts capable of representing consumer 
interests.91   
However, this is not to presume that the intervenors alone would 
would be sufficient.  Although these groups are organized, they fit 
within a very specific category and are not systematically available 
available and participatory in every realm that a public utility 
commission regulates.92  Furthermore, these groups are not always 
always focused on compliance, but generally only on certain policy 
policy goals like the bottom-line and the effect of ratepayers.93  Thus, 
Thus, their advocacy may include a specific bias to specific types of 
of administrative proceedings, with a specific intent for specific 
outcomes.   
Lastly, Professor Markell suggests using the internet as a vehicle 
vehicle for disseminating information.94  The internet “continue[s] to 
to refine and enhance its . . . for public disclosure and dialogue in the 
future.”95  Since Professor Markell published his article in 2000, the 
internet capabilities have expanded.96  The turn of the second 
millennium was the time of dial-up, where a landline phone 
connection was needed to connect to the internet.97  Now, a  mobile 
phone is the medium for accessing the internet.98  Certainly, since 
2000 the internet has become a powerful and influential vehicle for 
influencing public interest and disseminating information.99   
                                                                                                                  
90 See Understanding Third-Party Ownership Financing, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/repowertoolbox/understanding-third-
party-ownership-financing-structures-renewable-energy (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).  
91 Intervenor Compensation Program, supra note 89. 
92 See, e.g., Understanding Third Party Ownership Financing, supra note 90. 
93 See, e.g., About Us, THE UTIL. REFORM NETWORK, 
http://www.turn.org/about/ (last visited Feb 4, 2020); About UCAN, UTIL. 
CONSUMERS’ ACTION NETWORK, https://www.ucan.org/who-is-ucan/ (last visited 
Feb 4, 2020).   
94 Markell, supra note 83, at 101. 
95 Id.  
96 See, e.g., Grichawat Lowatcharin & Charles E. Menifield, Determinants of 
Internet-enabled Transparency at the Local Level: A Study of Midwestern County 
Web Sites, 47 ST. & LOCAL GOV. REV., 102, 102-15 (2015). 
97 See, e.g., Matthew Johnston, Smartphones Are Changing Advertising & 
Marketing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-
finance/062315/how-smartphones-are-changing-advertising-marketing.asp (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
98 See, e.g., id. 
99 See Lowatcharin & Menifield, supra note 96.   
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Thus, applied here, the internet provides a powerful and 
untapped resource for regulating industries.100  Many public 
utility commission websites publish proceedings, including 
pending decisions, recent filings, and an archive of past decisions 
agency rules.101  Furthermore, there are online forms that provide 
a practitioner or complainant with access to administrative 
remedies, these electronic filing systems allow potential 
complainants to file complaints and initiate proceedings against 
violating utilities.102  This plethora of access provides greater 
access to the public to monitor and report violations.103  The 
internet provides parties from across state jurisdiction to 
participate in hearings and to have their voices and comments 
heard at agency meetings.104  The internet allows interested 
parties to live stream agency meetings and other hearings that are 
open to the public.105  Thus, compared to the internet two decades 
ago, there are more resources available for greater transparency.   
However, public utility commission websites are not without 
shortcomings.  Many websites are difficult to navigate, with 
redundant links and pages that are out of date.106  Although a 
may find the required information to successfully launch 
against a utility, the difficulty is finding and navigating the 
reach the relevant information to ensure a successful complaint.107  
Furthermore, litigant access may be hindered because of 
confusion about proper administrative procedures. Whether a 
litigant has standing to file a complaint or whether they know the 
type of proceeding are to search for.108  These hindrances likely 
affect the public’s ability to keep these industries accountable.   
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Proceeding Information, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,  
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedings/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
101 See, e.g., Filing a Complaint, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,  
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/complaints/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); DPU 
Consumer Information, MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL., 
https://www.mass.gov/dpu-consumer-information (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., id.  
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Webcast Information, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=1204 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
106 But see Public Utilities Commission, NEV. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://puc.nv.gov/#content (last accessed Apr. 13, 2020). 
107 But see Utilities Complaint Form, ARIZ. CORP. COMM’N, 
http://efiling.azcc.gov/online-services/utilities-complaint-external (last accessed 
Apr. 13, 2020). 
108 See, e.g., Filing a Complaint, supra note 101.   
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Thus, the problem is not a lack of resources and opportunity, but 
an excess of them.109  Perhaps the next step in increasing the public’s 
ability to help regulate utilities is to present and reform commission 
websites and other data accessible on the internet.   
 
D. Incentive Reporting: Morality Based on Economic Efficiency 
Instead of relying on utilities to altruistically act well based on 
their moral judgment, an alternative may be to “provide positive 
incentives for the regulated community to examine what it’s doing, 
doing, see if there are problems, and correct them.”110  This policy 
first implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
(EPA), allows regulated parties to self-report any violations.111  By 
By self-reporting any violation, the potential fine for that violation 
would be reduced based on the agency’s discretion.112  Similarly, a 
a commission may attempt to adopt a similar methodology for self-
self-reporting where regulated industries could directly report its own 
own violation to the commission to enjoy a reduction on potential 
fines for those violations.   
This self-reporting serves two benefits.  First, this alleviates some 
some of the burden on the agency to review every detail of the 
industry’s compliance status—something that is infeasible due to the 
administrative limits of a commission and the vastness of data to 
review.113  Second, this would hopefully create a culture of self-
regulation among utilities.   
While the EPA program only provides a reduction of fines for 
self-reporting,114 self-reporting among regulated utilities would affect 
the utility’s record in the case of severe issues of non-compliance.115  
Such a policy would not require a complete elimination of fines, 
rather it would complement fines by providing an opportunity for 
regulated parties to take steps as insurance against more severe fines 
                                                 
109 But see Guide to Handling Complaints about Your Regulated Utility 
Service, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., 
https://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/ArticlesByTitle/E14FA4E402578324852
5782C006979E8?OpenDocument (last accessed Apr. 13, 2020).  
110 Markell, supra note 83, at 15.   
111 Id. at 16.   
112 Id.   
113 Id. at 104.  
114 Id. at 16.  
115 See, e.g., Compliance Record Review Document, KY. DEP’T OF EDUC., 3-4 
(June 2018), 
https://education.ky.gov/specialed/excep/forms/Documents/Compliance_Record_R
eview_Document_2018.pdf. 
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in the future.116  Indeed, such a system carries risks that parties 
will attempt to “game” the system by building enough credit to 
avert catastrophic fines during extraordinary events.117  Such a 
risk may arguably outweigh the significant benefit of better 
compliance and reporting. 
However, this reporting system may still fail if the incentives 
insufficiently encourage self-reporting.  Where the benefits from 
reporting do not outweigh the sanctions from the bad action, there 
no reason for a utility to expend resources to self-report and 
existing violations.  Furthermore, it may be significantly 
disadvantageous for the bad actor to self-report when the 
for the issue are worse than any benefit derived from reporting a 
problem; had they rolled the dice and let it remain undetected, 
may have been better off still.118   
With this framework, one is in a position to assess and analyze 
what a commission can seek to do to encourage utilities to act rightly.  
What can be done to resolve the discord in akratic behavior of the 
utilities to encourage the utility to act according to what they have 
deliberated and concluded to be the morally right action.119  In a 
sense, how can the regulator promote virtuous behavior by the 
regulated industry?   
What immediately seems best is an incentive program.  Similar to 
an incentive system,120 it seems that one of the best ways to 
encourage good behavior is to make that behavior more desirable.121  
Indeed, there is a framework for creating incentives for self-reporting, 
for creating benefits for those who self-report, and stricter penalties 
for those who do not catch errors.122  While this approach might seem 
attractive, it is probably not the best approach.   
There is the initial problem of administrating such a program.  
There are numerous concerns of line drawing, of placing a benefit 
possibly in the form of reduced penalty for any given standard for 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Designed to Fail: Why Regulatory Agencies Don’t Work, 
INDEP. SCI. NEWS, https://www.independentsciencenews.org/health/designed-
to-fail-why-regulatory-agencies-dont-work/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).  
117 See, e.g., id. 
118 Skeel, supra note 67.   
119 See supra Part II.A.   
120 Markell, supra note 83.   
121 See infra Part IV. 
122 See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 291-344 (Nancy L. 
Rose ed.) (2014); Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-
Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 583, 583-606 (1994).  
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reporting.123  In this way, any benefit ascribed to a certain reported 
violation would create a currency of discounts for bad action and the 
reporting of that action.124  A discount system, while laced with good 
intentions, is at risk of being gamed by regulated industries.125  They 
may choose to report only certain infractions to curry favor, while 
even generating fabricated situations to gain a specific benefit.126  In 
this way, infraction and reporting would be factored and integrated 
into a corporate structure of what the regulated industry does and how 
business is performed.   
A more immediate concern also arises when the incentive system 
fails to actually encourage good behavior.127  Indeed, while it may be 
well-intentioned to attempt an innovative, alternative framework for 
encouraging good behavior, it would be foolish and inefficient to 
move directly into a new regulation when it would clearly not work.  
Thus, it would be pointless to even attempt to integrate an unproven 
incentive system if the benefits are clearly not beneficial or enticing 
enough to dissuade a regulated industry’s bad behavior.   
Furthermore, an incentives system may be likened to some kind 
of rewards system.  Rewards are generally helpful to encourage 
certain behavior.128  In a way this is the carrot and stick problem, 
where sometime holding a carrot (encouragement) is more helpful to 
getting the benefit.129  However, that is not the case here.130  It seems 
superfluous for the regulator to create its own rewards system on top 
of the existing corporate, capitalistic rewards system where the 
regulated industry exists.131  It would further seem superfluous for 
creating a rewards system for obeying the law.132   
                                                 
123 See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 122, at 
306-09. 
124 See supra Part II.A.   
125 See, e.g., Designed to Fail: Why Regulatory Agencies Don’t Work, supra 
note 116.  
126 See, e.g., id. 
127 Markell, supra note 83.   
128 See, e.g., Robert Bruce, Regulation: Carrot or Stick?, FIN. TIMES, 
https://www.ft.com/content/3dae4b96-77eb-11dc-8e4c-0000779fd2ac (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2020).   
129 Id.   
130 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrot and Stick”: Post-Enron Regulatory 
Initiatives, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004). 
131 See Bruce R. Scott, The Political Economy of Capitalism 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch. 
Working Paper No. 07-037, 2006), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/publication%20files/07-037.pdf.  
132 See Ephrat Livni, Regulation Nation: What Industries Are Most Carefully 
Overseen?, FINDLAW (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://blogs.findlaw.com/free_enterprise/2016/02/regulation-nation-what-
industries-are-most-carefully-overseen.html.   
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In another sense, a rewards system for obeying the law would be 
like giving every automobile driver a dollar every time they drove 
without exceeding the speed limit.  While at the same time, creating 
an incentive system for drivers to report bad driving and speeding 
fails to make reasonable sense in any subjective calculus.  Beyond the 
surface problem that rewarding behavior that an actor is already 
obliged to perform, there is a problem of cost and funding.133  It 
seems unreasonable to affect certain treatment to others while 
withholding it from others.  There are questions like who would be 
more deserving?  How will resources be divided or shared?  Thus, an 
approach based purely on incentivizing good behavior likely seems 
doomed to fail.   
 
IV. INCENTIVE REGULATION APPLIED 
 
A. California Public Utility Commission History 
The CPUC was originally established as the Railroad 
to regulate the powerful and influential railroad industries 
California.134  Uniquely, the CPUC established its San Francisco 
headquarters far away from Sacramento.135   
As diverse utility-related industries have grown in California, 
Commission has regulated more utility providers.136  Due to its 
large size137 and significant gas and oil deposits,138 several energy 
giants developed in California.139  Notable energy giants in 
California are Pacific Gas and Electric,140 Southern California 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 122, at 
306-07. 
134 MAX THELEN, PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT OF CALIFORNIA (Eugene R. 
Hallett ed., 1st ed. 1912); see also CPUC History & Organizational Structure, 
supra note 17.   
135 See CPUC History & Organizational Structure, supra note 17.   
136 CPUC History & Organizational Structure, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); see also Utilities and 
Industries, supra note 3.   
137 Mark Otieno, What Is The Biggest State In The United States, 
WORLDATLAS.COM, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-biggest-
state-in-the-us.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); Company profile, PACIFIC GAS 
& ELECTRIC, https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/company-
information/profile/profile.page (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
138 California State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=CA (last visited Feb. 4, 
2020).    
139 PETER ASMUS, INTRODUCTION TO ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA 
NATURAL HISTORY GUIDES) (University of California Press, 1st ed. 2009).  
140 Company profile, supra note 137.  
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Edison,141 and San Diego Gas and Electric.142  As telephone 
technology arose in the first half of the century, the Commission 
began regulating the many regional telephone networks across the 
state.143  Recently, ride-hailing services and automated vehicles have 
have also become part of the Commission’s purview.144  As new 
technologies develop and present new challenges to the 
Commission’s regulation of disparate industries, it may be time to 
consider new rules for regulation of each of these industries.   
 
B. Statutory Authority for Penalties and Fines 
To reel in the powerful railroad industries, the California 
Constitution established the Commission as a constitutional 
agency.145  Section two of the California Constitution broadly states 
states that “[s]ubject to statute and due process, the commission may 
may establish its own procedures.  Any commissioner as designated 
designated by the commission may hold a hearing or investigation or 
or issue an order subject to commission approval.”146 
The California constitution has provided the Commission with 
broad authority and power to regulate investor-owned utilities.147  In 
In addition to regulating investor-owned utilities, the Commission has 
has used its administrative authority to establish its own rules and 
procedures and to further define its authority.148   
Relevant to this article, the legislature has limited the 
Commission's authority to issue monetary penalties in the Public 
Utilities Code (PUC) §§ 701, 734, 2102, 2107, and 2108.149   
Perhaps the broadest among these statutes is PUC § 701, which 
grants the Commission the power to establish any orders that are 
“necessary and convenient” for the regulation of investor-owned 
utilities.150  The Commission has broadly interpreted this section to 
provide statutory authority to issue fines or injunctions.151  Elsewhere, 
the Commission has interpreted this section to give it more extreme 
                                                 
141 Our Service Territory, S. CAL. EDISON, https://www.sce.com/tl/about-
us/who-we-are/leadership/our-service-territory (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
142 About Us, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELE., https://www.sdge.com/more-
information/our-company/about-us (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).   
143 Otieno, supra note 137.   
144 Id.  
145 THELEN, supra note 134, at 17-20.  
146 CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 2. 
147 THELEN, supra note 134.   
148 Id.  
149 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 701, 734, 2102, 2107 (1951). 
150 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (1951).  
151 See Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. Line, D. 19-01-022, 2019 WL 224252 
(Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jan. 10, 2019) [hereinafter D. 19-01-022].  
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remedies, including divestiture.152  Where the legislature is silent, 
the constitution grants the Commission the power to regulate a 
utility in any justifiable way.153  Thus, when finding alternative 
ways to regulate and broaden the scope of the Commission’s 
regulation, PUC § 701 will probably provide statutory grounds.  
Under PUC §§ 2107 and 2108, the Commission has statutory 
authority to calculate fines.154  Recently, the statutory maximum 
increased in PUC § 2107 from $50,000 to $100,000.155  Despite 
legislature altering PUC § 2107, it remains unclear whether the 
$100,000 fine is a maximum or a benchmark for Commission 
sanctions.156  Until the Commission fines a violator more than 
$100,000, the meaning of the new amount will stay unknown.   
 
1. Commission Distinction Between a Reparation and Fine 
Before discussing any penalty by the Commission, it is helpful 
distinguish a reparation from a fine.  The primary agency 
for issuing penalties is Decision (D.) 98-12-075.157  The decision 
developed from Rulemaking (R.) 97-12-088 and resulted from 
comments gathered from interested parties across the state.158   
In the final decision, the Commission specifically interpreted 
§ 734 to mean that “[t]he purpose [of a reparation] is to return 
funds to the victim which were unlawfully collected by the public 
utility.  Accordingly, the statute requires that all reparation 
amounts are paid to the victims.”159   
                                                 
152 See San Diego Gas and Electric Company’s Divestiture of Electric 
Generating Assets, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Environment/info/esa/divest-sdge/index.html (last 
accessed Apr. 14, 2020).  
153 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 
812 (2015). 
154 The California Courts affirmed the Commission’s authority to impose 
fines pursuant to § 2107.  See, e.g., Pac. Bell Wireless, LLC v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718 (2006). 
155 As the statutory maximum has been shifted for the first time since 2011, 
it remains uncertain whether this amount when compounded and applied to 
multiple utility violations of compliance will have a significant effect in 
deterring bad behavior. 
156 See State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 906 P.2d 1209 (1995). 
157 Standards of Conduct Governing Relationships Between Energy Util. and 
Their Affiliates, D. 98-12-075, 1998 WL 995679 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 17, 
1998) [hereinafter D. 98-12-075]. 
158 Standards of Conduct Governing Relationships Between Energy Util. and 
Their Affiliates, R. 97-12-088, 1998 WL 995679 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 28, 
1998). 
159 D. 98-12-075, at *53. 
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By this interpretation, reparation acts solely to repay victims 
based on a calculated monetary assessment of the damages.160  The 
The purpose of reparation is not to deter any bad action, nor is it 
deliberately meant to encourage the utility to correct its behavior.161  
behavior.161  Reparation serves more like restitution, with deterrence 
deterrence or a sense of punishment incidental to the monetary 
amount.162   
Thus, monetary reparations alone fail to account for non-
monetary harm committed by the utility.  While the utility may pay 
reparation to the injured party, this amount may not make any holistic 
or systemic change to the utility’s behavior.   
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission stated that “[t]he purpose of a 
a fine is to go beyond [reparations] to the victim and to effectively 
deter further violations by this perpetrator or others.”163  Where 
“[e]ffective deterrence creates an incentive for public utilities to avoid 
avoid violations.  Deterrence is particularly important against 
violations which could result in public harm, and particularly against 
against those where severe consequences could result.”164   
Thus, a fine presumably should be sufficient to encourage good 
good behavior.  Ideally, a fine should deter future bad action because 
because the risk or previous fines disincentivize bad action.  Thus, 
fines may prevent bad actors from benefiting from their bad actions 
actions and discourage other actors from misbehaving.165   
 
2. The Commission’s considerations for determining appropriate 
fines 
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission laid out five factors for 
determining an appropriate fine: (1) the severity of the offense; (2) 
the utility’s conduct; (3) the utility’s financial resources; (4) the 
totality of the circumstances in furtherance of the public interest; and 
(5) the role of precedent.166   
These factors closely match subsequent California case law.  The 
California Supreme Court in People v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company noted four factors for determining whether a fine is grossly 
                                                 
160 Id.   
161 Id.   
162 Randy Barnett, THE JUSTICE OF RESTITUTION, 25 AM. J. OF JURIS. 117, 117 
(1980).  
163 D. 98-12-075, at *54. 
164 Id.  
165 See Markell, supra note 83.   
166 D. 98-12-075, at *54. 
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disproportional to the gravity of the offense.167  Those factors 
include: (1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship 
between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in 
similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.168   
 
a. Severity of the offense 
This factor takes into consideration any economic harm, 
of any statutory or Commission directive, and the number of 
violations.169 
For economic harm, the Commission considers the victims’ 
amount of expense and the public utility’s unlawful benefits, 
that “the greater of these two amounts will be used in establishing 
fine.”170  The Commission also may consider violations of 
or compliance requirements.171  Although these do not harm 
consumers, it harms the integrity of the regulatory processes.  The 
legislature requires all California public utilities to comply with 
Commission directives.172  As noted in D. 98-12-075, “[s]uch 
compliance is absolutely necessary to the proper functioning of 
the regulatory process.  For this reason, disregarding a statutory or 
Commission directive, regardless of the effects on the public, will 
be accorded a high level of severity.”173   
The Commission also considers re-offenses in determining the 
severity.174  The decision noted that “[a] series of temporally 
distinct violations can suggest an on-going compliance deficiency 
which the public utility should have addressed after the first 
instance.  Similarly, a widespread violation which affects a large 
number of consumers is a more severe offense than one which is 
limited in scope.”175  For a continuing violation, PUC § 2108 
counts each day as a separate offense.176 
Thus, when the Commission imposes fines on a noncompliant 
utility, the fines may add up.  At the beginning of 2019, Assembly 
Bill 901 will set the upper statutory amount for fines at $100,000 
                                                 
167 People v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal. 4th 707 (2005) 
[hereinafter R.J. Reynolds]; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 
334 (1998) (where the Court used similar factors to determine that $350,000 
for failure to report taking more than $10,000 cash out of the country was an 
excessive fine). 168 R.J. Reynolds, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 728. 
169 D. 98-12-075, at *54.  
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 702 (1951).  
173 D. 98-12-075, at *55-56. 
174 Id. at *54.  
175 D. 98-12-075, at 56.  
176 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2108 (1951). 
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while leaving the lower statutory amount at $500.177  Because the 
legislature revised the statutory amount for the first time since 2011, 
2011, it remains uncertain whether the change will significantly deter 
deter bad behavior.178  
 
b. The conduct of the utility before, during, and after the offense 
The conduct factor considers the utility’s culpability and its 
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and Commission 
directives.179  The Commission considers prudent practice, which 
requires that all public utilities take reasonable steps to ensure 
compliance with Commission directives.180  Reasonable steps include 
include the utility becoming familiar with applicable laws and 
regulations, and most critically, regularly reviewing its operations to 
to ensure full compliance.181  In evaluating the utility’s compliance 
compliance efforts, the Commission considers its past compliance 
with Commission directives.182 
In D. 98-12-075, the Commission considered the utility’s actions 
to detect a violation.183  This includes diligently monitoring their 
activities “[w]here utilities have for whatever reason failed to meet 
this standard, the Commission will continue to hold the utility 
responsible for its actions.  Deliberate, as opposed to inadvertent 
wrong-doing, will be considered an aggravating factor.”184 
The Commission considered a public utility’s steps to promptly 
and cooperatively report and correct violations.185  When a public 
utility is aware of a violation, the Commission expects the public 
utility to promptly bring it to the attention of the Commission.186  The 
definition of “prompt” will vary based on the nature of the 
violation.187  Thus, the Commission may need to oversee each 
industry’s safety requirements in addition to its industry-specific 
regulations.188   
 
                                                 
177 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2107 (1951).  
178 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.  
179 D. 98-12-075, at *57.  
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 D. 98-12-075, at *58. 
188 This includes interpreting the internal corporate requirements in addition to 
monitoring and inspecting that the utility is following procedures.  
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c. The financial resources of the utility 
The financial resources factor considers the financial 
the public utility.189  The Commission must adjust the utility’s 
deter misconduct, without excessively penalizing it, based on its 
financial resources.190   
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission evaluated the market value 
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) when calculating an appropriate 
penalty amount.191  The Commission considered various 
factors, including company share price, equity, and investor 
expectation.192  The Commission also considered relevant 
to determine whether “PG&E should be able to pay a penalty of 
magnitude without harming ratepayers or its ability raise the 
needed for revenue-producing investments required to provide 
adequate and safe service.”193 
However, this analysis may be problematic when extreme 
punishment of the utility might have far-reaching consequences 
consumers.194  A financially troubled utility may be incapable of 
paying the Commission’s fine, causing it to declare bankruptcy.195   
There must be a balance between an adequate fine that would 
deter a utility’s misconduct, and a fine that would force a utility to 
declare bankruptcy.  If a fine is too small, it would equate to 
payment for wrongdoing, or a license for violation.  Alternatively, 
if a fine is too excessive, it could push the utility towards 
bankruptcy and harm the utility’s public users who the regulator 
seeks to protect.   
 
d. The totality of the circumstances in furtherance of the public 
interest 
This factor takes into consideration facts that may mitigate or 
exacerbate the degree of wrongdoing.196  This includes setting a 
fine at a level that effectively deters further unlawful conduct by 
the regulated utility and requiring that the Commission 
specifically tailor the package of sanctions, including any fine, to 
                                                 
189 D. 98-12-075, at *50.  
190 Id.  
191 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., D. 15-04-024, 2015 WL 4648065, at *62 (Cal. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n July 23, 2015) [hereinafter D. 15-04-024].  
192 Id. at *62-66.  
193 Id. at *70.  
194 Dale Kasler, Tony Bizjak, Alexei Koseff, & Sophia Bollag, PG&E 
plans to file bankruptcy. Will the utility go under? We’ve got some answers, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 14, 2019), 
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the unique facts of the case.197  The Commission reviews facts that 
tend to mitigate the degree of wrongdoing as well as any facts which 
exacerbate the wrongdoing.  In all cases, the harm is evaluated from 
the perspective of the public interest.198   
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission evaluated “PG&E’s statutory 
statutory obligation to provide safe and reliable gas service, the 
pervasive nature of PG&E’s recordkeeping shortfalls, the impact of 
of the San Bruno explosion on its residents, and the Commission’s 
Commission’s and the public interest in ensuring safe and reliable 
natural gas service.”199   
Thus, in assessing this factor the Commission evaluates the effect 
effect that the fine will have on ratepayers and consumers who use the 
use the public utility.200  Corollary to the previous factor, this requires 
requires the Commission to be mindful that any decrease in the 
utility’s ability to provide reliable service will ultimately be of greater 
detriment to the public.201  Furthermore, legislation, and the 
Commission’s rules and policies are mindful of the economic effect 
of fines to the ratepayers and public consumers who use the utility.202  
There is a network of cost-recovery procedures and allowances that 
affect the publicly owned utility’s ability to pass fines off as costs to 
ratepayers as opposed to shareholders.203 
 
e. The role of precedent 
This factor takes into consideration the proposed outcome with 
“previously issued decisions which involve the most reasonably 
comparable factual circumstances and explain any substantial 
differences in outcome.”204  Yet, the Commission adjudicates a wide 
range of cases with sanctions, many cases of first impression, so the 
outcomes rarely comparable. 205 
In D. 15-04-024, the Commission struggled to find any relevant 
comparison to prior its decisions to determine the appropriate 
penalties for a gas pipeline explosion.206  Furthermore, the diversity 
of regulated industries by the Commission presents additional 
problems for finding adequate comparisons between pending cases 
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and prior decisions.  As described above, the Commission 
regulates industries ranging from ride-sharing services like Lyft 
and Uber to electric and gas utility companies.207  It may be 
difficult to find even a slightly comparable match of precedential 
decisions between any two industries.  While for some industries 
there may be a large amount of precedential cases, for others there 
may be no prior precedent for reference or comparison.   
 
3. Assessing the D. 98-12-075 Framework and Potential for 
Development 
More than a decade since the Commission voted on R.  98-01-
009,208 the problems facing the Commission have changed.  
many goals were considered theoretical and infeasible at the time, 
now advances in technology, reporting, and resources can further 
ensure industry compliance.209  At the same time, with the 
widening of the socioeconomic gaps in San Francisco,210 where 
the Commission is headquartered,211 immense competition for 
hiring poses unique personnel and hiring challenges.212   
Incidentally, while technology increases the regulator’s ability 
and tools to efficiently monitor industry action, the drivers of that 
technology make it increasingly difficult for the Commission to 
find operators with the ability to effectively apply those tools.213  
With the reintroduction of agency decentralization and 
Commission offices stationed in different parts of the state, the 
Commission is seeking ways to broaden its access to different 
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industries.214  Beyond the geographic and socioeconomic confines an 
expensive metropolitan area, the Commission now has the flexibility 
to establish offices elsewhere.215  While decentralization is still in its 
early stages, there is potential this early expansion can facilitate 
greater change in how the Commission regulates and fines industries 
to enforce compliance.216   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the pervasiveness of electricity217 and the increased impetus 
by states for either cheaper or cleaner energy production,218 the role 
of the public utility commission should remain prominent for the 
foreseeable future.  While diverse states may seek to advance varying 
energy projects based on the original ratemaking imperatives of most 
public utility commissions, much of future regulations will probably 
concern how utilities arrive at fair rates.  While at times this may 
include misbehavior, the respective public utility commission must be 
ready to react and respond to these bad actions.  At the same time, 
because of the size and scope of regulated industries, public utility 
commissions must be willing to respond to good behavior.  Although 
there may be significant challenges ahead, many of these state 
commissions are presented with enormous statutory authority and 
tools for regulation.219  Thus, there remains significant confidence in 
the hope that those in charge of regulation have the ability to regulate 
well.  It only remains for them to wisely and aptly operate those tools. 
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